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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
DANILO PASCUAL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
CASE NO. 890062 
BASIS OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this appeal is conferred upon this Court 
pursuant to Rule 3, Utah Rules of the Supreme Court and 
§78-2-2(3)(J), Utah Code Annotated (1988). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Defendant-Appellant appeals from a jury verdict 
finding him guilty of criminal homicide, murder in the second 
degree, a first degree felony, rendered on the 8th day of 
December, 1988, in the Second Judicial District Court of Weber 
County, State of Utah. Defendant-Appellant filed his Notice of 
Appeal with the Supreme Court on February 17, 1989. This was a 
Pro Say Notice of Appeal. Pursuant to a Motion For Resentencing, 
Defendant-Appellant filed a Stipulation and Order authorizing the 
Court to remand the case back to the Second Judicial District 
Court, before the Honorable Stanton Taylor, for resentencing for 
purposes of perfecting an Appeal. The case was ordered remanded 
on May 1, 1989. His second Notice of Appeal was filed September 
20, 1989. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. The Court's failure to give an eye witness instruc-
tion was plain error and the defense counsel's failure to ask for 
said instruction constituted a deficient performance that preju-
diced the Defendant and denied him his 6th Amendment Right to 
effective assistance of counsel* 
2. Appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel 
in violation of the 6th Amendment to the Untied States 
Constitution and Article 1, Section 12 of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah. 
(a) Defense counsel's failure to request an eyewit-
ness instruction was prejudicial error for reasons more specifi-
cally set forth in Issue I contained herein. Further, because of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, he was deprived of a fair 
trial and, thus, his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution were violated. 
(b) Defense Counsel's failure to object to instruc-
tion #10, Court Record @ pg. 81, constituted ineffective assis-
tance of counsel and plain error. 
(c) Appellant was denied effective assistance of 
counsel when counsel formulated his theory of the case, presented 
that theory to the jury, then abandoned that theory half-way 
through Appellant's trial because he failed to properly 
investigate his case prior to commencement of trial. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 25, 1988, Danilo Pascual, residing at 3268 
Childs Street, Ogden, Utah, had friends over to his home and was 
eating dinner at approximately 7:00 p.m. in the evening. Jamie 
Gomez and Jerry Garza drove by Pascual!s home, where Lawrence 
Lucero, Ray Hane, Chris Mandoza and the Appellant were visiting. 
Appellants friends were sitting on the front porch when Garza and 
Gomez began shouting from the car window at Lucero. (T.T.Q pg. 
494). Apparantently these two groups of people, or at least 
Lucero and Garza, were very angry with each other. (T.T.Q 
pg.116). Approximately ten minutes thereafter, the car went by 
the porch again, Appellant being in his house but having heard 
yelling from the car. (T.T. 495). The individuals sitting on 
the Appellants porch were Phillipino/Lucero group. The individu-
als in the car were the Mexicans Cholos group. 
The two individuals from the car went to the home of 
Johnny Martinez, Jamie Gomez' uncle. (T.T.Q pg. 119) They 
recruited the help of Rumeldo Gomez, John Martinez and several 
other people and approached the field close to Appellant's home. 
(T.T.Q pg 121, 502) Lawrence Lucero and Jerry Garza were appar-
ently enemies, Lucero having blamed Garza for an attack on 
Lucerofs female cousin. (T.T.O pg. 412) Lucero and the other 
individuals at Appellant's home jumped off the porch and 
approached the empty field adjacent to Appellant's home to meet 
the on-coming group (T.T.O pg. 120) More of the Gomez/Garza crowd 
began to appear, to-wit: Joe Reyes, Rumeldo Gomez, Victor Abrego, 
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Larry Rodgregos and Johnny Martinez, among others. (T.T.Q pg.120) 
Upon confrontation between the two groups of people, 
Jerry Garza had in his possession a knife. (T.T.Q pg. 121). 
Apparently someone from the other group of people had a bat. 
(T.T.Q pg. 122). The group encountered blows against each other 
and crossed the street towards Todd Salazar's house. (T.T.Q pg. 
122). Sometime during the assault by each group on the other, the 
Defendant obtained a shotgun from his bedroom and approached the 
field holding the gun in the air. (T.T.Q pg. 500, 507). With the 
Appellant were Ranaldo Hain, Lawrence Lucero, Chris Mendoza and 
Franklin Lucero. The fight moved from the field, across the 
street and into the front yard area of Todd Salazar, the eventual 
victim. 
Involved in this fight were two distinct groups of 
people. One group of people, as referred during the defense 
counsel's opening statement, were Central City Cholos, a Mexican 
gang group. (T.T.Q pgs. 73, 253). The other group of people 
were referred to as the Phillipinos. Although defense counsel 
began the trial in an attempt to bring out the relationship 
between the gangs and establish an intent to be afraid and for 
the Appellant to justifiably defend himself, defense counsel 
abandoned that strategy in the middle of the trial, thereby 
clearly prejudicing the Appellant, and committing plain error. 
Rulmedo Gomez testified that most of the people on the ground 
during the fight were Rulmedo's people, to-wit: Cholos. (T.T.Q 
pg. 170). His group had a bat and his group had a long knife. 
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Ranaldo Hane testified that Todd was on the corner of Childs, 
across the street from his house, when he became involved in the 
fight. (T.T.Q pg.412, 429). Evidently Todd and another individ-
uals with him approached the Appellant and began swinging what 
appeared to be a sharp object and hitting the Appellant. (T.T.Q 
pgs. 438,475). Appellant then began to swing back with his shot 
gun and apparently hit Salazar in the head. As Todd's body 
turned, the Appellant's gun went off, hitting Todd Salazar at an 
angel to the back and subsequently killing him. (T.T.@ pgs. 511, 
377). During the trial on the matter, virtually all the testi-
mony with regards to the Appellant's involvement in the gang 
fight was eyewitness testimony. No eyewitness cautionary 
instruction was requested and no eyewitness cautionary instruc-
tion was given. 
Also, the Prosecutor made continuing comments, during 
opening statement and by calling Natalie Chase to the witness 
stand, concerning Todd's background with regards to having a com-
mon law wife, a baby and another baby on the way. Such remarks 
were clearly inadmissible, irrelevant and highly prejudicial. 
Defense counsel objected to the comments made by the prosecutor 
with regards to Mr. Salazar's background and moral family 
commitment, during an incamera recess with Judge Taylor. Judge 
Taylor sustained the objection, but no cautionary instruction was 
given to the jury. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE I 
THE COURT'S FAILURE TO GIVE AN EYE WITNESS INSTRUCTION 
WAS PLAIN ERROR AND THE DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO ASK 
FOR SAID INSTRUCTION CONSTITUTED A DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE 
THAT PREJUDICED THE DEFENDANT AND DENIED HIM HIS 6TH 
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
On the facts of this case, it was plainly improper for 
the trial Court not to have given a cautionary instruction to the 
jury focusing its attention on the well-documented factors that 
affect the reliability of eye witness testimony. As noted in 
State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 488 (Utah 1986), 
The literature is replete with empirical studies docu-
menting the unreliability of eye witness testimony. 
And, although Long dealt with the actual identification of the 
Defendant as the perpetrator of a crime, the same factors relied 
upon by the Court in that case exist here. 
Clearly, human perception is the inexact and human mem-
ory is both limited and fallible. A more rigorous approach to 
cautionary instructions, given the facts and circumstances of 
this case, is appropriate. Here the Appellant's theory of the 
case was clear from the beginning of his trial. Two groups of 
people were involved in a gang war encounter (T.T.O pg. 73). 
Appellant, in an attempt to prevent escalation of the fighting, 
displayed a shot-gun. The State's witnesses, members of one 
group (T.T.Q pg. 170), testified that Salazar did not become 
involved in the fight and never left his yard. Defense witnesses 
testified that Salazar in fact became involved in the fight and 
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in fact, attacked Appellant (T.T.@ pg. 432). Whether Appellant's 
theory of the case was as an accidental shooting or justifiable 
self defense, he relied upon the jury's understanding of the lim-
its and fallibility of eye witness testimony. Without the 
instruction or expert testimony, the jury would not be aware of 
the inherent problems with this kind of testimony. 
The jury was never told that the process of perceiving 
events and remembering them is not as simple or as certain as 
turning on a camera and recording everything the camera sees on 
tape or film for later replay. Nor were they told that what wit-
nesses perceive and remember is the result of a much more complex 
process, one that does not occur without involving the whole 
person, and one that is profoundly affected by who we are and 
what we bring to the event of perception. Sue R. Buckhout, 
Eyewitness Testimony, 15 Jurimetrics J. 171, 17a (1975) 
(reprinted from 231 Scientific American 23 Dec. 1974). 
As stated in E. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (1979), and 
State v. Long, supra, 721 P.2d @ 488-489.. 
Research on human memory has consistently shown that 
failures may occur and inaccuracies creep in at any 
stage of what is broadly referred to as the "memory 
process". This process includes the acquisition of 
information, its storage, and its retrieval and communi-
cation to others. These stages have all been exten-
sively studied in recent years, and a wide variety of 
factors influencing each stage have been identified. 
During the First acquisition stage, a wide array of fac-
tors have been found to affect the accuracy of an 
individual's perception. Some of these are rather 
obvious. 
For example, the circumstances of the observation are 
critical: the distance of the observer from the event, 
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the length of time available to perceive the event, the 
amount of light available, and the amount of movement 
involved. Buckhout, supra, at 17 3. However, perhaps 
the more important factors affecting the accurancy of 
one's perception are those factors originating within 
the observer. One such limitation is the individual's 
physical condition, including both obvious infirmities 
as well as such factors as fatigue and drug or alcohol 
use. Another limitation which can affect perception is 
the emotional state of the observer. Contrary to much 
accepted lore, when an observer is experiencing a marked 
degree of stress, perceptual abilities are known to 
decrease significantly. See, e.g., Woocher, supra, at 
979 n.29. 
A far less obvious limitation of great importance arises 
from the fact that the human brain cannot receive and 
store all the stimuli simultaneously presented to it. 
This forces people to be selective in what they perceive 
of any given event. See Woocher, supra, at 976-77. To 
accomplish this selective perception successfully, over 
time each person develops unconscious strategies for 
determining what elements of an event are important 
enough to be selected out for perception. The rest of 
the stimuli created by the event are ignored by the 
brain. These unconscious strategies of selective per-
ception work quite well in our day-to-day lives to pro-
vide us with only the most commonly useful information, 
but the strategies may result in the exclusion of infor-
mation that will later prove important in a Court 
proceeding. 
Another mechanism we all develop to compensate our 
inability to perceive all aspects of an event at once is 
a series of logical inferences: if we see one thing, we 
assume, based on our past experience, that we also saw 
another that ordinarily follows. This way we can 
"perceive" a whole event in our mind's eye when we have 
actually seen or heard only portions of it. Id. at 9 80. 
The implications of this memory strategy, for Court pro-
ceedings are similar to those of selective perception. 
Other important factors that affect the accuracy of a 
viewer's perception, and which are unique to each 
observer, include the expectations, personal 
experiences, biases, and prejudices brought by any indi-
vidual to a given situation. Buckhout, supra, at 
175-76. A good example of the effect of preconceptions 
on the accuracy of perception is the well-documented 
fact that identifications tend to be more accurate where 
the person observing and the one being observed are of 
the same race. Wells, Applied Eyewitness Testimony 
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Research: System Variables and Estimator Variables, 36 
J. Personality & Social Psych, 1546, 1550 (1978); Note, 
Cross Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 
Cornell L. Rev. 934 (1984); Bibicoff, supra, at 101. 
The memory process is also subject to distortion in the 
second or retention stage, when information that may or 
may not have been accurately perceived is stored in the 
memory. Research demonstrates that both the length of 
time between the witnessf s experience and the recollec-
tion of that experience, and the occurrence of other 
events in the intervening time period, affect the accu-
racy and completeness of recall. Just as in the percep-
tion stage, where the mind infers what occurred from what 
was selected for perception, in the retention stage peo-
ple tend to add extraneous details and to fill in memory 
gaps over time, thereby unconsciouly constructing more 
detailed, logical, and coherent recollections of their 
actual experiences. Thus, as eyewitnesses wend their 
way through the criminal justice process, their reports 
of what was seen and heard tend to become "more 
accurate, more complete and less ambiguous" in 
appearance. Buckhout, supra, at 179. The implications 
of this mental strategy for any criminal Defendant whose 
conviction hinges on an eyewitness identification are 
obvious. See Woocher, supra, at 98 3 n.53. 
Research has also underminded the common notion that the 
confidence with which an individual makes an identifica-
tion is a valid indicator of the accuracy of the 
recollection. K. Deffenbacher, Eyewitness Accuracy and 
Confidence: Can We Infer Anything About Their 
Relationship?, 4 Law and Human Behavior 243 (1980); 
Lindsay, Wells, Rumpel, Can People Detect Eyewitness 
Identification Accuracy Within and Across Situations?, 
66 J. Applied Psych. 79, 80-82 (1981); Bibicoff, supra, 
at 104 n.35. If fact, the accuracy of an identification 
is, at times, inversely related to the confidence with 
which it is made. Buckhout, supra, at 184. 
Finally, the retrieval stage of the memory process—when 
the observer recalls the event and communicates that 
recollection to others—is also fraught with potential 
for distortion. For example, language imposes limits on 
the observer. Experience suggests that few individuals 
have such a mastery of language that they will not have 
some difficulty in communicating the details and nuances 
of the original event, and the greater the inadequacy, 
the greater the likelihood of miscommunication. An 
entirely independent problem arises when one who has 
accurately communicated his recollection in a narrative 
form is then asked questions in an attempt to elicit a 
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more complete picture of the event described. Those 
asking such questions, by using a variety of subtle and 
perhaps unconscious questioning techniques, can signifi-
cantly influence what a witness "remembers" in response 
to questioning. And as the witness is pressed for more 
details, his responses become increasingly inaccurate. 
See Loftus, Reconstructing Memory: The Incredible 
Eyewitness, 15 Jurimetrics J, 188 (1975). In addition, 
research has documented an entirely different set of no 
less significant problems that relate to the 
suggestiveness of police lineups, showups, and photo 
arrays. See, e.g., Buckhout, supra, at 179-87. 
Although research has convincingly demonstrated the 
weaknesses inherent in eyewitness identification, jurors 
are, for the most part, unaware of these problems. 
People simply do not accurately understand the 
deleterious effects that certain variables can have on 
the accuracy of the memory process of an honest 
eyewitness. See K. Deffenbacher & E. Loftus, Do Jurors 
Share a Common Understanding Concerning Eyewitness 
Behavior?, 6 Law and Human Behavior 15 (1982); J. 
Brigham, R. Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective Jurors 
to Estimate the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identification, 7 
Law and Human Behavior 19 (1983). Moreover, the common 
knowledge that people do possess often runs contrary to 
documented research findings. See Loftus, supra, at 
171-77. 
Perhaps it is precisely because jurors do not appreciate 
the fallibility of eyewitness testimony that they give 
such testimony great weight. See Sanders, supra, at 
189-90 n.6; Loftus, supra, at 8-19. In one notable 
study involving a simulated criminal trial, 18% of the 
jurors voted to convict the Defendant when there were no 
eyewitnesses to the crime. However, when a credible 
eyewitness was presented, 72% voted to convict. And, 
suprisingly, even when presented with an eyewitness who 
was quite thoroughly discredited by counsel, a full 6 8% 
still voted to convict. 15 Jurimetrics J. at 189-90. 
In one study which found a poor relationship between 
witness confidence and accuracy of identification, the 
researchers concluded, "(i)t is possible that the 
jurors1 rate of belief is around 80% irrespective of the 
actual rate of witness accuracy.: G. Wells, R. Lindsay, 
T Ferguson, Accuracy, Confidence, and Juror Perception 
in Eyewitness Identification, 64 J. Applied Psych. 440, 
447 (1970). 
Appellant does not suggest that it was appropriate for 
the Court to give the complete Telfaire (469 F.2d 552)(D.C. Cir. 
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1972) instruction as outined in State v. Long, supra. However, 
Appellant does believe that he was entitled to an instruction 
similar to the second component of Telfaire, to-wit: that which 
addressed the issue of credibility of eyewitness testimony. 
Appellant's entire defense hinged upon accident and/or 
justification with regards to the shooting. Virtually all of the 
evidence admitted during his trial was introduced through eyewit-
ness testimony: the kind of eyewitness testimony with which the 
second component of the Telfaire instruction is concerned. And 
without having had the availability and benefit of an expert wit-
ness to explain the inherent dangers of eyewitness testimony, the 
jury was left in the dark as to the complex process through which 
witnesses perceive, and remember and recollect. 
The Research outlined in Long and briefly set forth 
herein confirm that Defendant was entitled to the benefit of the 
following instruction: 
The eyewitness testimony that you have heard was an 
expression of belief or impression by the witness. To 
find the Defendant not guilty, you need not find that 
the eyewitness was insincere, but merely that the wit-
ness was mistaken in his (her) belief or impression. 
Many factors affect the accuracy of eyewitness 
testimony. In considering whether Defendant was justi-
fied in the shooting death of Todd Salazar, or whether 
he was an aggressor or in the combat by agreement, you 
should consider the following. 
1) Did the witness have an adequate opportunity to 
observe the criminal actor? 
In answering this question, you should consider: 
a) the length of time the witnesses observed the actor; 
b) the distance between the witness and the actor; 
c) the extent to which the actor's features were visible 
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and undisguised; 
d) the light or lack of light at the place and time of 
observation; 
e) the presence (or) absence of distracting noises or 
activity during the observation; 
f) any other circumstances affecting the witness1 
opportunity to observe the person committing the crime. 
2) Did the witness have the capacity to observe the per-
son committing the crime? 
In answering this question, you should consider whether 
the witness' capacity was impaired by: 
a) stress or fright at the time of observation; 
b) personal motivations, biases or prejudices; 
c) uncorrected visual defects; 
d) fatigue or injury; 
e) drugs or alcohol. 
You should also consider whether the witness is of a 
different race than the criminal actor. Identification 
by a person of a different race may be less reliable 
than identification by a person of the same race. 
3) Was the witness sufficiently attentive to the 
criminal actor at the time of the crime? 
In answering this question, you should consider whether 
the witness knew that a crime was taking place during 
the time he (she) observed the actor. Even if the wit-
ness had adequate opportunity and capacity to observe 
the criminal actor, he (she) may not have done so unless 
he (she) was aware that a crime was being committed. 
4) Was the witness1 testimony concerning the Defendant 
completely the product of his (her) own memory? 
In answering this question, you should consider: 
a) the length of time that passed between the witness1 
original observation and his (her) testimony concerning 
the Defendant; 
b) the witness* (mental) capacity and state of mind at 
the time of the events. 
c) the witness' exposure to opinions, descriptions or 
recollection given by other witnesses, to photographs or 
newspaper accounts, or to any other information or 
influence that may have affected the independence of his 
(her) testimony. 
d) any instances when the witness, or any eyewitness to 
the crime, failed to identify the Defendant as the 
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aggressor in the fight or that the Defendant did not 
engage in the fight by agreement. 
e) any instances when the witness, or any eyewitness to 
the crime, gave a description of the events that is 
inconsistent with his (her) prior statements. 
I again emphasize that the burden of proving that the 
Defendant is the person who committed the crime is on 
the prosecution. If, after considering the evidence you 
have heard from the prosecution and from the defense, 
and after evaluating the eyewitness testimony in light 
of the considerations listed above, you have a reasona-
ble doubt about whether the Defendant committed the 
crime and was justified, you must find him not guilty. 
Instruction #3, Court Record at page 73, which deals 
with the credibility of witnesses, is not sufficient to protect 
the Appellant's due process right to a fair trial in this case. 
Although this instruction vaguely touches on some concerns voiced 
by the research community with regards to eyewitness testimony, 
superimposed on all discussion of contested eyewitness testimony 
is a failure to differentiate that function of credibility which 
is deliberate and intended from capability and capacity which 
encompass physical limitations of the testifying witness as an 
actual, even though perhaps unintended, constituent of 
invalidity. The Court should not ignore the well documented 
frequency of mistake which occurs in eyewitness testimony with 
regard for what should be appropriate in the tough cases. See 
Annotation, Admissibility, at Criminal Prosecution, of Expert 
Testimony on Reliability of Eyewitness Testimony, 46 A.L.R. 4th 
1047 (1986), and Annotation Necessity of, and Prejudicial Effect 
of Omitting Cautionary Instructions to Jury as to Reliability of 
or Factors to be Considered in Evaluating Eyewitness 
Identification and Testimony State Cases, 23 A.L.R. 4th 1089 
-14-
(1983) . 
The credibility instruction given to Appellant's jury 
did not put the jury on notice that failures may occur and 
inaccuracies creep in at any stage of the memory process; from the 
circumstances surrounding the witnesses1 observation, such as 
fatigue and drug or alcohol use; to the capacity of the human 
brain to receive and store all the stimuli simultaneously pre-
sented to it, together with determining what elements of an event 
are important enough to be selected out and which elements will 
be ignored by the brain; to the complexities of human 
perceptions, including expectations, personal experiences, biases 
and prejudices; to the retention stage when people tend to add 
extraneous details and fill in memory gaps; to the retrieval 
stage when the observer recalls the event and communicates that 
recollection to others. This last stage of the memory process is 
fraught with potential for distortion, especially the limitation 
that language imposes on the observer. Because the witnesses for 
the defense, as well as the state!s witnesses, all expressed lim-
ited language skills, the reasons for requiring the Court to give 
the above-mentioned cautionary instruction are enhanced. 
Defendant was from the Phillipines and at least one of 
his witnesses had been in this country, at most, only three years 
(T.T.@ pg. 466). An interpreter was required for much of the 
Defendant's case in chief. (T.T.Q pg. 509). As noted in State v. 
Long, 721 P2d @ 489, "Experience suggests that few individuals 
have such a mastery of language that they will not have some 
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difficulty in communicating the details and nuances of the origi-
nal event, and the greater the inadequacy, the greater the like-
lihood of miscommunication." The problem is obviously enhanced 
when the witness is not fluent in the language with which the 
jury is experienced and understands. 
Failure to give a cautionary eyewitness instruction was 
plain error. Also, defense counsel's failure to request same 
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of 
Appellant's Sixth Amendment rights under the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah. 
ISSUE NO, II 
APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN 
VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 1, SECTION 12 OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
(a) Defense counsel's failure to request an eyewitness 
instruction was prejudicial error for reasons more specifically 
set forth in Issue I contained herein. Further, because of inef-
fective assistance of counsel, he was deprived of a fair trial 
and, thus, his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 
of the United States Constitution were violated. 
The Utah Supreme Court, following constitutional 
mandates, recognizes the right to effective assistance of 
counsel. State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203, 204 (Utah 1976). In a 
recent decision, State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 1989), the 
Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to the standard for 
effective assistance of counsel established in Strickland vs. 
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Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068 (1984): "A 
Defendant who raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
must show both that his or her counsel rendered a deficient per-
formance in some demonstrable manner and that a reasonable proba-
bility exists that except for ineffective counsel, the result 
would have been different." A reasonable probability is defined 
as "a possibility sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. @ 694, 104 S. Ct.@ 2068. 
Given the facts and circumstances of this case, defense 
counselfs failure to request the cautionary instruction was 
clearly not the result of reasonable professional judgment. For 
example, Jaime Gomez testified that his memory was bad because he 
was running, and, as a result, just briefly saw the gun Defendant 
possessed. (T.T.Q pg. 125). Yet he stated earlier that he saw 
Appellant with the fun and in fact stopped to ask him why he had 
it. (T.T.Q pg. 123) Then again, he said he first noticed the gun 
when Appellant hit Todd with it. (T.T.Q pg. 129). This is pre-
cisely the kind of eyewitness testimony with which researchers 
have been concerned, to-wit: "in the retention stage, people tend 
to add extraneous details and to fill in memory gaps over time, 
thereby unconsciously constructing more detailed, logical, and 
coherent recollections of their actual experiences. Long @ pg. 
489. The jury should have been instructed with regards to this 
information and Appellant had a right to have them so instructed. 
Had the jury been given this information, the members thereof 
would have been able to focus their attention on the factors that 
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affect eyewitness testimony. Failure to request the instruction 
should undermine this Court's confidence in the verdict against 
the Appellant because when the circumstances surrounding the eye-
witness testimony raise serious questions of reliability. 
The record is replete with evidence that each "side" of 
the fight in this case contained its own members, with each group 
standing against the other. (T.T.O pgs. 170, 195, 253, 259-60, 
423). There was also evidence introduced by state and defense 
eyewitnesses that Todd Salazar was involved in the fighting 
(T.T.Q pgs. 188, 220, 242, 249, 412, 429, 432-33, 438, 501-2). 
Under these circumstances an eyewitness instruction was critical, 
not only to educate the jury, but to present the Defendant's 
theory of the case. Circumstances surrounding the group affilia-
tion and Appellant's assertion of justification and self-defense 
raise grave concerns about the eyewitnesses reliability. The 
lack of any conceivable tactical basis for counsel's omission in 
requesting this instruction distinguishes this case from many of 
the previous cases where ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
were rejected. 
b) Defense Counsel's failure to object to instruction 
#10, Court Record @ pg. 81, constituted ineffective assistance of 
counsel and plain error. 
Although defense counsel properly included the statutory 
language contained in part of §76-2-402, U.C.A. (1974), defining 
justifiable force (Ct Record @ pg. 85), Subsection 2(c) of that 
section has been misstated in Instruction #10 and not addressed 
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at all in Instruction #13* 
Instruction 13 reads as follows: 
Conduct which is justified is a defense to prosecution 
for any offense based on the conduct. The defense of 
justification may be claimed when the actor's conduct is 
in defense of persons or property under the circum-
stances described as follows: 
A person is justified in threatening or in using force 
against another when and to the extent that he reasona-
bly believes that such force is necessary to defend him-
self or a third person against such other's imminent use 
of unlawful force; however, a person is justified in 
using force which is intended or likely to cause death 
or serious bodily injury only if he reasonably believes 
that the force is necessary to prevent death or serious 
bodily injury to himself or to a third person or to pre-
vent the commission of a foreseeable felony. 
A person is not justified in using force under the cir-
cumstances listed above if he initially provokes the use 
of force against himself with the intent to use force as 
an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant. 
Instruction #10 states: 
You are instructed that in any prosecution for criminal 
homicide it shall be no defense to the prosecution that 
the Defendant was a party to any duel, mutual combat, or 
other consenual altercation, if during the course of the 
duel, combat, or altercation any deadly weapon was used. 
Subsection 2(c) of §76-2-402, U.C.A. provides that a 
person is not justified in using force under the circumstances 
specified in Paragraph 1, if he: "was the aggressor or was 
engaged in a combat by agreement, unless he withdraws from the 
encounter..." (emphasis added). 
First of all, whether or not the Appellant was the 
aggressor or had agreed to engage in combat requires a factual 
finding. Instruction #10 is simply and clearly a misstatement of 
the law and did not require the jury to find that Appellant was 
-19-
an aggressor or fighting as a result of agreement, or as he 
contended, justifiably defending himself and his friend. 
As the Court noted in State v. Maritzsky, 104 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 34, 39 (1989), 
"Appellate Court's must review each case carefully to 
prevent the infrequent meritorious claim from being 
refexively swept into the tide of affirmance by the 
chronicles of probability. Our job is not to mechani-
cally apply the two-part standard set forth above, but 
instead to focus upon the fundamental fairness of the 
proceeding challenged." 
Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
is specific in this case: the state requested an instruction that 
totally defeats Appellant's justification instruction the 
instruction given was a mis-statement of the law and defense 
counsel failed to object to its being given; an instruction, 
which left the jury assuming that the justification defense did 
not apply to "mutual combat" if a deadly weapon was used. 
Appellant's justification instruction does not cure the defect. 
Appellant was entitled to have the issues of (1) whether he con-
sented to fight, rather than being forced into a gang fight by 
circumstance, and (2) whether he was the aggressor, decided by a 
well-informed jury. 
Clearly counsel's deficient performance undermines your 
confidence in the verdict against Appellant. A reasonable proba-
bility existed that the jury's verdict would have been more 
favorable to Appellant had the proper instruction been given. 
The jury then would have been prepared to at least consider the 
lesser included offenses contained in Instructions 8 and 9, 
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Court Record @ pg. 79, 80. 
(c) Appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel 
when counsel formulated his theory of the case, presented that 
theory to the jury, then abandoned that theory half-way through 
Appellant's trial because he failed to properly investigate his 
case prior to commencement of trial. 
Defense counsel's opening statement begins with the 
assertion that the Central City Cholos, a Chicano group of people 
numbering between 25 to 27, carrying knives, guns and baseball 
bats, was the gang opposing Appellant and his four friends. 
(T.T.O pgs. 73, 76). He also asserted, at page 73, that either 
Garza or Gomez was the President of the Cholo gang. 
Shortly after the parties had concluded their opening 
statements, the proceedings resumed in chambers out of the hear-
ing of the jury. The State expressed its concern with defense 
counsel's argument during his opening that one of the State's 
witnesses was head of the Central City Cholos. The objection was 
based on relevance and inappropriate character evidence (T.T.Q 
pgs. 79, 80). Defense counsel attempted to argue that the exis-
tence of the gang affilication went to opportunity and motive, "a 
Mexican gang as opposed to a bunch of people off the street." 
(T.T.Q pg. 80) . 
The prosecutor finally admitted that this evidence would 
be relevant if there were a showing that Appellant and other 
group members were aware of the affiliation. (T.T.Q pg. 81). 
Defense counsel and the Court agreed, recognizing the requirement 
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on the defense to lay a proper foundation. 
During eyewitness testimony, several witnesses alluded 
to the gang affiliation. Rumaldo Gomez testified that most of 
the Chicano group were his people and that Appellant, a 
Phillipino guy and the Luceros, were being called out (T.T.Q pg. 
170). Johnny Martinez testified that he did not see a baseball 
bat in the hands of any member of "his group" (T.T.Q pg. 219). 
He also testified that he observed Salazar fighting with two 
individuals (T.T.Q pg. 220). Even the prosecutor made reference 
to the "Lucero/Phillippino group" and the "other group." (T.T.Q 
pg. 253). Further, the defense attorney reinforced the notion 
that the witnesses knew of the gang affiliation when, examining 
Victor Abergo, he asked what happened to the three Phillippinos 
and the two Chicanos. (T.T.Q pg. 259). The trial transcript is 
riddled with gang affiliation references. 
Not only was the gang affiliation recognized by the 
State's witness, but defense witnesses as well. For example, 
Ranaldo Hain testified that "we not like the Cholo that jump peo-
ple ten to one." (T.T.Q pg. 445). 
Yet, in light of all the foundational requirements met 
merely by witness testimony, defense counsel did not pursue his 
theory of the case, to-wit: that Appellant was swept into a gang 
war and justifiably shot one of its members. 
In fact, defense counsel abandoned his theory of the 
case before he even started the Defendant's case-in-chief. 
Counsel told the Court, in chambers, that he "was not sure of 
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(his client's) state of mind at the time... I would be willing to 
abandon it rather than get into any further issue on it." (T.T.@ 
pg. 404). 
This is the type of ill-prepared approach to criminal 
defense work addressed in State v. Crestani, 106 Utah Adv. Rpts. 
(March 30, 1989), relying on Strickland v. Washington, supra @ 
466 U.S. @ 680, 690-91, 104 S.Ct. @ 2060, 2066. 
The evidence in the record is anything but clear and 
uncontroverted with regards to Appellants, and gang members 
state of minds. 
Under Strickland: 
The Sixth Amendment imposes on counsel a duty to 
investigate, because reasonably effective assistance 
must be based on professional decisions and informed 
legal choices can be made only after investigation of 
options. 
These standards require no special amplification in 
order to define counsel's duty to investigate, the duty 
at issue in this case Strategic choices made after 
thought investigation of law and facts relevant to 
plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and 
strategic choices made after less than complete investi-
gation are reasonable precisely to the extent that rea-
sonable professional judgments support the limitations 
on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to 
make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable 
decision that makes particular investigations 
unnecessary. Strickland, 466 U.S. @ 680, 690-91, 104 
S.Ct. @ 2060, 2066 (emphasis added) 
Cited in Cristani, supra @24. 
Defense counsel had a duty to investigate his client's 
state of mind at the time the event took place so he could prop-
erly prepare his client and present the facts. Further, 
Appellant's state of mind was critical to the defense of 
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justification. Defense counsel put the jury on notice that 
Appellant became involuntarily involved in a gang war and was not 
the aggressor• He then failed to complete the foundational 
requirements or pursue the issue of why Appellant was afraid for 
his own life or that of his friend. Without pursuing the gang 
affiliation theory of the case, Appellant's defense became 
meaningless. The omissions by counsel that are alleged herein 
are not the result of reasonable professional judgment. Had 
counsel thoroughly reviewed his case, interviewed his witnesses 
and prepared his client for trial, the critical issue of the 
Appellant's opportunity and state of mind would have been able to 
be placed before the jury. Without that information, the jury 
had no other choice but than to convict Appellant as charged, 
especially in light of Appellant's confession (albiet confused 
because of the language barrier.) 
Defense counsel further failed in his duties to effec-
tively assist and represent Appellant by his failure to articu-
late grounds for admission of the "gang affiliation" evidence. 
Rule 404(b) Utah Rules of Evidence provides that: 
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible 
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
Evidence of the witnesses' affiliation with gang and gang wars 
was critical in order to establish proof of motive, opportunity 
to leave the scene, intent to commit murder, preparation, plan, 
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knowledge or absence of mistake or accident. It is unforgivable 
that this evidence was not made available to the jury. 
Further, Rule 406, Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine 
practice of an organization, whether corroborated or not 
and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is rele-
vant to prove that the conduct of the person or organi-
zation on a particular occasion was in conformity with 
the habit or routine practice. 
The frequency of gang wars, the parties' participation in same 
and the routine practice of these gangs in dealing with disputes, 
such as the one involved herein, would have given the jury neces-
sary information with regards to resolving the issues of 
aggression and justification. The picture painted without this 
information left no doubt in the juryfs mind that Appellant com-
mitted the crime as charged. Appellant could not of, nor did he 
get, a fair trial without this information having been provided 
to the jury. 
Finally, defense counsel failed to invoke Rule 6 08(c), 
Utah Rules of Evidence, which provides: 
Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be 
shown to impeach the witness either by examination of 
the witness or by evidence otherwise adduced. 
Why didn't defense counsel ask both Garza and Gomez 
whether their association with the Central City Cholos would 
affect their ability to be candid and honest? Why did he not ask 
them whether they were even affiliated with this or any other 
group or gang? 
I suggest that if defense counsel had properly investi-
gated his case, he would have been able to get that evidence 
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before the jury or devise a theory of the case without it, but 
before Appellant's matter came on for jury trial. The manner in 
which the defense presented its case denied Appellant a fair 
trial. 
ISSUE NO, Ill 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS REFUSAL TO ALLOW APPELLANT 
TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE THAT HIS HOUSE WAS SET ON FIRE TWO 
DAYS AFTER THE SHOOTING. 
Approximately two days after the shooting of Todd 
Salazar, Appellant's house was set on fire (T.T.Q 314). 
Appellant's attorney attempted to establish the fact of the fire 
by questioning a police officer who had knowledge of same (T.T.@ 
pg. 311). 
Subsequently, during an in chamber proceeding, the pros-
ecutor objected to any further reference of the fire on grounds 
of relevancy. (T.T.Q pg. 314). Defense counsel argued that the 
evidence of the fire was relevant and tends to establish why 
Appellant did not go home after the shooting, to-wit: "the volite 
situation was the very reason," and why Appellant behaved the way 
he did the night of the shooting. (T.T.Q pg. 315). Further, 
counsel argued that the fact of the fire was "supportive of the 
very feelings (Appellant) had" the night of the shooting. (T.T.@ 
pg- 316). 
The Court ruled that the prejudicial effect of the evi-
dence outweighed any relevance, and was therefore not admissible. 
(T.T.Q pg. 316). 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
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guarantees a criminal Defendant the right to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses. "Cross-examination is the principal 
means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of 
his testimony are tested." Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 
(1974). "The Sixth Amendment right to confrontation requires 
only that the accused be permitted to introduce all relevant and 
admissible evidence." State v. Johns, 615 P.2d 1260, 1264 (Utah 
1980) . 
In light of the inferences from witnesses concerning the 
various relationships between the players, such as the gang 
affiliation; and Appellant's theory of the case concerning justi-
fiable homicide and/or accident, the issue of the fire that 
burned Appellant's house shortly after the gang fight was very 
relevant as to his intent, preparation plan, knowledge or absence 
of mistake or accident on the night of the shooting. 
Appellant did not return home after the shooting because 
he was afraid of the Mexican gang members and what they would do 
to him. After all, the only reason Appellant was involved in the 
first place was because he attempted to stop an otherwise explo-
sive situation. He knew the Cholos were mad at him, just like he 
knew the Cholos bombed his house in retaliation. 
The trial Court abused its discretion in not allowing 
Appellant to continue to apprise the jury of all the facts rele-
vant to the fight that occured the night of the shooting, includ-
ing the bombing of his house. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court failed to give an eyewitness cautionary 
instruction, and as a result, committed plain error. The defense 
counsel's failure to ask for this instruction constituted defi-
cient performance that prejudiced the Defendant and denied him 
his Sixth Amendment Right to effective assistance of counsel. 
The jury in this case was never informed that the process of pro-
ceeding events and remembering them is not as simple or as cer-
tain as turning on a camera and recording everything the camera 
sees on tape or film for later replay. 
Appellant's entire defense hinged upon accident and/or 
justification with regards to the shooting of Todd Salazar. 
Virtually all of the evidence admitted during his trial with 
regards to the events surrounding the shooting was introduced 
through eyewitness testimony. The jury was completely left in 
the dark as to the complex process through which witnesses 
perceive, remember and recollect. Additionally, because most of 
the witnesses that testified at Appellant's trial all had limited 
language skills, the reasons for requiring the Court to give a 
cautionary instruction were enhanced. Appellant was denied 
effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, 
Section 12 of the Constitution of the State of Utah. His failure 
to request the eyewitness instruction, along with his failure to 
object to Instruction Number 10, constituted said ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Instruction 10 completely eliminated the 
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failure to properly investigate his case resulted in the 
Appellant being denied a fair trial. Additionally, Appellant's 
attorneys failure to articulate reasons for admission of the gang 
affiliation evidence with regards to the Rules of Evidence was 
blatantly ineffective. Defendant-Appellant's defense of justifi-
cation became meaningless in light of the fact that gang 
affiliation issues were never raised to the jury, the instruc-
tions given to the jury were completely wrong and his attorney 
failed to adequately investigate the case or to prepare his cli-
ent for testifying during the trial, and as a result thereof, had 
to abandon his only defense to the crime charged. 
DATED this 7th day of May, 1990. 
GARY L. GALE " " *" 
Attorney at Law 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I do hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to: David L. Wilkinson, Attorney 
General, State of Utah, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111, on this 8th day of May, 1990. 
RANDINE SALERNO 
Attorney at Law 
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& * 
IN JTHE-.irST$ICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
State 
^t^V^EHer 
vs. 
DANILO DELACRUZ PASCUAL 
Defendant. 
) JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, AND 
COMMITMENT TO UTAH STATE 
PRISON 
No, 19045 
ST: 
—00O00— 
Defendant having been convicted by [X] a jury; [ ] the court; [ ] plea of guilty; 
CI plea of no contest; of the offense of ^ ^ N H g g ^ ^ m € m : . * 
felony of the'^£££ degree, being now present in court and ready for sentence, 
is now adjudicated guilty of the above offense and is now sentenced as follows: 
THE BASIC SENTENCE 
] not to exceed five (5) years at the Utah State Prison; 
JU—not less than one (1) year nor more than fifteen (15) years at Utah State Prison; 
$3 not less than five (5) years and which may be for life at Utah State Prison; 
[ ] to pay fine in the amount of $ . 
ENHANCED PUNISHMENT FOR FIREARM USE 
"(Defendant is additionally sentenced as follows: 
f ^ l 03 one (1) year at Utah State Prison, pursuant to 76-3-203(1), $&k}9Cc63i; Consecutive; 
[] not to exceed five (5) years at Utah State Prison pursuant to 76-3-203(1),(2) or (3); 
[] not less than five (5) years nor more than ten (10) years at Utah State Prison, 
pursuant to 76-3-203(4); 
said sentence to run consecutive to the basic sentence as set forth above. 
HABITUAL CRIMINAL ALTERNATIVE PUNISHMENT 
Upon a finding that the defendant is in the status of an habitual criminal, the 
defendant is sentenced to: 
[] not less than five (5) years and which may be for life at Utah State Prison, 
RESTITUTION 
(K$ Defendant is ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $3.530.25 > to 
Office of Crims Victim Reparations - $2,718.67 & Jose Salazar - $811.58. 
efendant is remanded into custody of: 
55 the Sheriff of this county, for delivery to the Warden or other appropriate 
official at the Utah State Prison for execution of sentence; or 
[] the Warden for execution of this sentence. 
DATED this 3rd day of January 
BENJAMIN SIMsV 
DISTRICT COURT 
SSSa^ Clerk 
Deputy Clerk 
JUDGE 
11. TAYLOR 
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.403 1J' CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES * Amend. XVI 
on the list of those voted for as President, the House 
of Representatives shall choose immediately, by bal-
lot, the President. But in choosing the President, the 
votes shall be taken by states, the representation 
from each state having one vote; a quorum for this 
purpose shall consist of a member or members from 
two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the 
states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House 
of Representatives shall not choose a President when-
L ever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, be-
fore the fourth day of March next following, then the 
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of 
the death or other constitutional disability of the 
President.—The person having the greatest number 
of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-Presi-
dent, if such number be a majority of the whole num-
ber of Electors appointed, and if no person have a 
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the 
list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a 
quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of 
the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the 
whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no 
person constitutionally ineligible to the office of Pres-
ident shall be ehgibie to that of Vice-President of the 
Umted States. 
AMENDMENT X m 
Sectioa 
1. [Slavery prohibited.] 
2. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
Section 1. 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except 
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall 
have been duly convicted, 3hall exist within the 
Umted States, or any place subject to their jurisdic-
tion. 
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment] 
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protec-
tion ] 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office ] 
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be 
paid.] 
5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — 
Equal protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the Umted 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citi-
zens of the Umted States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the Umted States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap-
pointment] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the 
several States according to their respective numbers, 
counting the whole number of persons in each State, 
excluding Indians not taxed. But when the nght to 
vote at any election for the choice of electors for *resi-
dent and Vice-President of the Umted States, r" epre-
sentatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial 
Officers of a State, or the members of the Legisl ature 
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabita its of 
such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citi-
zens of the Umted States, or in any way abridged, 
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, 
the basis of representation therein shall be redu< ed in 
the proportion which the number of such mali citi-
zens shall bear to the whole number of male en ozena 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representat ve in 
Congress, or Elector of President and Vice Pres dent, 
or hold any office, civil or military, under the L nited 
States, or under any State, who, having previously 
taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or is an 
officer of the Umted States, or as a member of any 
State legislature, or as an executive or judicial cfficer 
of any State, to support the Constitution of the 
Umted States, shall have engaged in insurrection or 
rebellion against the same, or given aid or comi art to 
the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a v )te of 
two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — 
Debts of the Confederacy and c aims 
not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the Umted S bates, 
authorized by law, including debts incurred foi pay-
ment of pensions and bounties for services m sup-
pressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be ques-
tioned. But neither the Umted States nor any State 
shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred 
in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the L nited 
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipat on of 
any slave; but all such debts, obligations, and c aims 
shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by ap-
propriate legislation, the provisions of this article. 
AMENDMENT XV 
Section 
1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color i tot to 
disqualify] 
2. [Power to enforce amendment] 
Section 1. [Right of citizens to vote — Ra :e or 
color not to disqualify.] 
The nght of citizens of the Umted States tc vote 
shall not be demed or abndged by the Umted £ states 
or by any State on account of race, color,, or pre vious 
condition of servitude. 
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce this arti-
cle by appropriate legislation. 
AMENDMENT XVT 
[Income tax.] 
The Congress 3hall have power to lay and collect 
taxes on incomes, from whatever source deived, 
without apportionment among the several States, 
and without regard to any census or enumention. 
Art I, § 9 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 408 
accused of the commission of a felony while on proba-
tion or parole, or while free on bail awaiting trial on a 
previous felony charge, and where the proof is evi-
dent or the presumption strong. 1973 
[Offenses bailable.] [Proposed.] 
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bail-
able except: 
(a) persons charged with a capital offense 
when there is substantial evidence to support the 
charge; or 
(b) persons charged with a felony while on pro-
bation or parole, or while free on bail awaiting 
trial on a previous felony charge, when there is 
substantial evidence to support the new felony 
charge; or 
(c) persons charged with a crime, as defined by" 
statute, when there is substantial evidence to 
support the charge ^ncpfiie court finds by clear" 
~ancT convincing evidence that the person would 
constitute a substantial clanger to self or any 
"Utherperson or to the community or is likely to 
flee the jurisdiction of the court if released on 
bail. 
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pend-
ing appeal only as prescribed by law. [1989] 
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel pun-
ishments.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines 
shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual 
punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or impris-
oned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor. 
1896 
Sec . 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the nght of trial by jury shall re-
main inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, ex-
cept in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight ju-
rors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall con-
sist of four jurors. In criminal cases the verdict shall 
be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the ju-
rors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be 
waived unless demanded. 1896 
Sec . 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or reputa-
tion, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary 
delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting 
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a 
p a r t y . 1896 
Sec 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
nght to appear and defend in person and by couna&L-
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his 
own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the atten-
dance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public tnaj_by_qn impar t s ) IUTV of the county or dlS-
tnct inwhich the nffkna* is alleged to have been com-
nutted, and the nght to appeal in all cases In no 
^instance shall any accused person, before finaTjudgi 
^nJgnTTbe compelled to advance money or tees" to se-
cure the n^hts herein guaranteed. The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a 
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her hus-
band, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
1896 
Sec 13. [Prosecution by information or indict-
ment — Grand jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by 
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after 
examination and commitment by a magistrate, un-
less the examination be waived by the accused with 
the consent of the State, or by indictment, with or 
without such examination and commitment. The for-
mation of the grand jury and the powers and duties 
thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 
1949 
Sec 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — 
Issuance of warrant.] 
The nght of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, particularly descnbmg 
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 1896 
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — 
Libel] 
No law shall be passed to abndge or restrain the 
freedom of speech or of the press. In all cnminal pros-
ecutions for libel the truth may be given in evidence 
to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the 
matter charged as libelous is true, and was published 
with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party 
shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the nght 
to determine the law and the fact. 1896 
Sec 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Excep-
tion.] 
There shall be no impnsonment for debt except in 
cases of absconding debtors. 1896 
Sec 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or 
military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the 
free exercise of the nght of suffrage. Soldiers, in time 
of war, may vote at their post of duty, m or out of the 
State, under regulations to be prescribed by law 
1896 
Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Im-
pairing contracts.] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law im-
pairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 
1896 
Sec 19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
Treason against the State shall consist only in 
levying war against it, or m adhenng to its enemies 
or in giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be 
convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two 
witnesses to the same overt act. 1896 
Sec . 20. [Military subordinate to the civil 
power. ] 
The military shall be in stnct subordination to the 
civil power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be 
quartered m any house without the consent of the 
owner; nor in time of war except in a manner to be 
prescribed by law. ISM 
Sec 21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except 
as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall 
have been duly convicted, shall exist within this 
State . 1896 
AMENDMENTS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENTS I-X [BILL OF RIGHTS] 
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVT 
AMENDMENT I 
[Religious and political freedom.] 
Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the nght of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances. 
AMENDMENT II 
[Right to bear arms.] 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the se-
curity of a free State, the nght of the people to keep 
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT m 
[Quartering soldiers.] 
No Soldier shall, m time of peace, be quartered in 
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in 
time of war, but m a manner to be prescribed by law 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The nght of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — 
Due process of law and just compensation 
clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or m the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger, nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the nght to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of 
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence 
AMENDMENT VH 
[Trial by jury in civil cases.] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the nght of trial by 
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, 
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the 
United States, than according to the rules of the com-
mon law.-
AMENDMENT VIH 
[Bail — Punishment] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted. 
AMENDMENT DC 
[Rights retained by people.] 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people. 
AMENDMENT X 
[Powers reserved to states or people.] 
The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, 
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the peo-
ple. 
AMENDMENT XI 
[Suits against states — Restriction of judicial 
power.] 
The judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit m law or equity, com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State. 
AMENDMENT XII 
[Election of President and Vice-President] 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, 
and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, 
one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of 
the same state with themselves; they shall name in 
their ballots the person voted for as President, and in 
distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-Presi-
dent, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons 
voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as 
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, 
which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit 
sealed to the seat of the Government of the United 
States, directed to the President of the Senate;-—The 
President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the 
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the 
certificates and the votes shall then be counted,—The 
person having the greatest number of votes for Presi-
dent, shall be the President, if such number be a ma-
jority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and 
if no person have such majority, then from the per-
sons having the highest numbers not exceeding three 
402 
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(3) When the actor's conduct is reasonable dis-
cipline of minors by parents, guardians, teachers, 
or other persons in loco parentis; 
(4) When the actor's conduct is reasonable dis-
cipline of persons in custody under the laws of 
the state; 
(5) When the actor's conduct is justified for 
any other reason under the laws of this state. 
1973 
3-2-402. Force in defense of person — Forcible 
felony defined. 
(1) A person is justified in threatening or using 
irce against another when and to the extent that he 
sasonabiy believes that such force is necessary to 
efend himself or a third person against such other's 
nminent use of unlawful force; however, a person is 
istifled in using force which is intended or likely to 
ause death or serious bodily injury only if he reason-
bly believes that the force is necessary to prevent 
eath or serious bodily injury to himself or a third 
erson, or to prevent the commission of a forcible fel-
ny 
(2) A person is not justified in using force under 
he circumstances specified in paragraph (1) of this 
ection if he: 
(a) Initially provokes the use of force against 
himself with the intent to use force as an excuse 
to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant, or 
(b) Is attempting to commit, committing, or 
fleeing after the commission or attempted com-
mission of a felony; or 
(c) Was the aggressor or was engaged in a 
") combaTby agreement, unless he withdraws from 
£ the encounter and effectively communicates to 
\ such other person his intent to do so and the 
/ , other notwithstanding continues or threatens to 
continue the use of unlawful force. 
(3) For purposes of this section, a forcible felony 
includes aggravated assault, mayhem, murder m the 
first and second degree and manslaughter, kidnap-
mg, and aggravated kidnaping, rape, forcible sodomy, 
and aggravated sexual assault, as they are defined in 
chapter 5 of this code, and also includes arson, rob-
bery, and burglary, as defined in chapter 6 of this 
code. Any other felony offense which involves the use 
of force or violence against a person so as to create a 
substantial danger of death or serious bodily injury 
also constitutes a forcible felony Burglary of a vehi-
cle, as defined in Section 76-6-204, shall not consti-
tute a forcible felony except where the vehicle is occu-
pied at the time unlawful entry is made or attempted. 
1974 
76-2-403. Force in arrest. 
Any person is justified in using any force, except 
deadly force, which he reasonably believes to be nec-
essary to effect an arrest or to defend himself or an-
other from bodily harm while making an arrest. 1973 
76-2-404. Peace officer's use of deadly force. 
(DA peace officer, or any person acting by his com-
mand in his aid and assistance, is justified in using 
deadly force when: 
(a) the officer is acting in obedience to and in 
accordance with the judgment of a competent 
court in executing a penalty of death; 
(b) effecting an arrest or preventing an escape 
from custody following an arrest, where the offi-
cer reasonably believes that deadly force is neces-
sary to prevent the arrest from being defeated by 
escape, and 
(l) the officer has probable cause to believe 
that the suspect has committed a felony of-
fense involving the infliction or threatened 
infliction of death or serious bodily injury; or 
(n) the officer has probable cause to be-
lieve the suspect poses a threat of death or 
serious bodily injury to the officer or to 
others if apprehension is delayed; 
(c) the officer reasonably believes that the use 
of deadly force is necessary to prevent death or 
serious bodily injury to the officer or another per-
son. 
(2) If feasible, a verbal warning should be given by 
the officer prior to any use of deadly force under Sub-
section (l)(b) or (l)(c). MST 
76-2-405. Force in defense of habitation. 
(1) A person is justified in using force against an-
other when and to the extent that he reasonably be-
lieves that the force is necessary to prevent or termi-
nate the other's unlawful entry into or attack upon 
his habitation; however, he is justified in the use of 
force which is intended or likely to cause death or 
serious bodily injury only if: 
(a) the entry is made or attempted m a violent 
and tumultuous manner, surreptitiously, or by 
stealth, and he reasonably believes that the 
entry is attempted or made for the purpose of 
assaulting or offering personal violence to any 
person, dwelling, or being in the habitation and 
he reasonably believes that the force is necessary 
to prevent the assault or offer of personal vio-
lence, or 
(b) he reasonably believes that the entry is 
made or attempted for the purpose of committing 
a felony in the habitation and that the force is 
necessary to prevent the commission of the fel-
ony. 
(2) The person using force or deadly force in de-
fense of habitation is presumed for the purpose of 
both civil and criminal cases to have acted reasonably 
and had a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death 
or serious bodily injury if the entry or attempted 
entry is unlawful and is made or attempted by use of 
force, or in a violent and tumultuous manner, or sur-
reptitiously or by stealth, or for the purpose of com-
mitting a felony. 1985 
76-2-406. Force in defense of property. 
A person is justified in using force, other than 
deadly force, against another when and to the extent 
that he reasonably believes tha t force is necessary to 
prevent or terminate criminal interference with real 
property or personal property: 
(1) Lawfully in his possession; or 
(2) Lawfully in the possession of a member =of 
his immediate family; or 
(3) Belonging to a person whose property he 
has a legal duty to protect. 1973 
CHAPTER 3 
PUNISHMENTS 
Part 
1. Classification of offenses, 
2. Sentencing. 
3. Fines and special sanctions.» 
4. Limitations and special provisions on sentences. 
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Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to 
prove conduct; exceptions; other 
crimes. 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a 
person's character or a trait of his character is not 
admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in 
conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a per 
tinent trait of his character offered by an ac 
cused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, 
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a perti-
nent trait of character of the victim of the crime 
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to 
rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of 
peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecu-
tion in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the 
victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the 
character of a witness, as provided in Rules 607, 
608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to 
prove theCchaja^tex^La personam order to show that 
he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident 
Rule 405. Methods of proving character. 
(a) Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which 
evidence of character or a trait of character of a pei-
son is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as 
to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opin-
ion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into 
relevant specific instances of conduct. 
(b) Specific instances of conduct. In cases in 
which character or a trait of character of a person is 
essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof 
may also be made of specific instances of his conduct. 
Rule 406. Habit; routine practice. 
' Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine 
V practice of an organization, whether corroborated or 
) not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is 
"S relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or 
/ organization on a particular occasion was in confer-
va mity with the habit or routine practice. 
Rule 407. Subsequent remedial measures . 
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if 
taken previously, would have made the event less 
likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures 
is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable con-
duct in connection with the event. This rule does not 
require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent mea-
sures when offered for another purpose, such as prov-
ing ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary 
measures, if controverted, or impeachment. 
Rule 408. Compromise and offers to compro-
mise. 
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offenng or promising 
to furnish, or (2) accepting or offenng or promising to 
accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or 
attempting to compromise a claim which was dis-
puted as to either validity or amount, is not admissi-
ble to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or 
its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made 
in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissi-
ble. This rule does not require the exclusion of any 
evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is 
presented in the course of compromise negotiations. 
This rule also does not require exclusion when the 
evidence is> offered for another purpose, such as prov-
ing bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a con-
tention of undue delay, or proving an effort to ob-
struct a criminal investigation or prosecution 
Rule 409. Payment of medical and similar ex-
penses . 
Evidence of furnishing or offering or promising to 
pay medical, hospital, or similar expenses occasioned 
by an injury is not admissible to prove liability for 
the injury. 
Rule 410. Inadmissibility of pleas, plea discus-
sions, and related statements. 
Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence 
of the following is not, in any civil or cnminal pro-
ceeding, admissible against the defendant who made 
the plea or was a participant in the plea discussions. 
(1) a plea of guilty which was later withdrawn; 
(2) a plea of nolo contendere; 
(3) any statement made in the course of any 
proceedings under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules 
of Cnmmal Procedure or comparable state proce-
dure regarding either of the foregoing pleas, or 
(4) any statement made in the course of plea 
discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting 
authonty which do not result in a plea of guilty 
or which result in a plea of guilty later with-
drawn. 
However, such a statement is admissible d) in any 
proceeding wherein another statement made in the 
course of the same plea or plea discussions has been 
introduced and the statement ought in fairness be 
considered contemporaneously with it, or (n) in a 
criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement if 
the statement was made by the defendant under oath, 
on the record and in the presence of counsel. 
Rule 411. Liability insurance. 
Evidence that a person was or was not insured 
against liability is not admissible upon the issue 
whether he acted negligently or otherwise wrong-
fully. This rule does not require the exclusion of evi-
dence of insurance against liability when offered for 
another purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership, 
or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness. 
Rule 412. [Reserved.] 
ARTICLE V. 
PRIVILEGES. 
Rule 501. Privilege; general rule. 
Pnvilege is governed by the common law, except as 
modified by statute or court rule. 
ARTICLE VI. 
WITNESSES. 
Rule 601. General rule of competency. 
(a) General rule of competency. Every person is 
competent to be a witness except as otherwise pro-
vided in these rules. 
(b) Statement of declarant in action for his 
wrongful death. Evidence of a statement by the de-
ceased is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if 
offered against the plaintiff in an action for wrongful 
death. 
(c) Statement of decedent offered in action 
against his estate. 
(1) Evidence of a statement* is not made inad-
missible by the hearsay rule when offered in an 
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action upon a claim or demand against the estate 
of the declarant if the statement was made upon 
the personal knowledge of the declarant at a time 
when the matter had been recently perceived by 
him and while his recollection was clear 
(2) Evidence of a statement is inadmissible un-
der this section if the statement was made under 
circumstances such as to indicate its lack of 
trustworthiness.' 
Rule 602. Lack of personal knowledge. 
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evi-
dence is introduced sufficient to support a finding 
that he has personal knowledge of the matter. Evi-
dence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, 
consist of the testimony of the witness himself. This 
rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 703, relating 
to opinion testimony by expert witnesses. 
Rule 603. Oath or affirmation. 
Before testifying, every witness shall be required to 
declare that he will testify truthfully, by oath or affir-
mation administered in a form calculated to awaken 
his conscience and impress his mind with his duty to 
do so. 
Rule 604. Interpreters. 
An interpreter is subject to the provisions of these 
rules relating to qualification as an expert and the 
administration of an oath or affirmation that he will 
make a true translation. 
Rule 605. Competency of judge as witness. 
The judge presiding at the trial may not testify in 
that trial as a witness. No objection need be made in 
order to preserve the point. 
Rule 606. Competency of juror as witness. 
(a) At the trial. A member of the jury may not 
testify as a witness before that jury in the trial of the 
case m which he is sitting as a juror If he is called so 
to testify, the opposing party shall be afforded an op-
portunity to object out of the presence of the jury. 
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indict-
ment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict 
or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any mat-
ter or statement occurring during the course of the 
jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon 
his or any other juror'3 mind or emotions as influenc-
ing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or 
indictment or concerning his mental processes in con-
nection therewith, except that a juror may testify on 
the question whether extraneous prejudicial informa-
tion was improperly brought to the jury's attention or 
whether any outside influence was improperly 
brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may his affidavit 
or evidence of any statement by him concerning a 
matter about which he would be precluded from testi-
fying be received for these purposes. 
Rule 607. Who may impeach. 
The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any 
party, including the party calling him. 
Rule 608. Evidence of character and conduct of 
witness. 
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of charac-
ter. The credibility of a witness may be attacked or 
supported by evidence in the form of opinion or repu-
tation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evi-
dence may refer only to character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character 
is admissible only after the character of the witness 
for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or repu-
tation evidence or otherwise. 
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific in-
stances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of 
attacking or supporting his credibility, other than 
conviction of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not 
be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, 
in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthful-
ness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-ex-
amination of the witness (1) concerning his character 
for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concenung 
the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of 
another witness as to which character the witness 
being cross-examined has testified. 
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or 
by any other witness, does not operate as a waiver of 
his privilege against self-incrimination when exam-
ined with respect to matters which relate only to 
credibility. 
(c) Evidence of bias. Bias, prejudice or any mo-
tive to misrepresent may be shown to impeach the 
witness either by examination of the witness or by 
evidence otherwise adduced. 
Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of convic-
tion of crime. 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the 
credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been 
convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from 
him or established by public record during cross-ex-
amination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by 
death or imprisonment in excess of one year under 
the law under which he was convicted, and the court 
determines that the probative value of admitting tins 
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defen-
dant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, 
regardless of the punishment. 
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this 
rule is not admissible if a period of more than ten 
years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of 
the release of the witness from the confinement im-
posed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, 
unless the court determines, in the interests of jus-
tice, that the probative value of the conviction sup-
ported by specific facts and circumstances substan-
tially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, evi-
dence of a conviction more than ten years old as cal-
culated herein, is not admissible unless the proponent 
gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written 
notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the 
adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest the 
use of such evidence. 
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate 
of rehabilitation. Evidence of a conviction is not ad-
missible under this rule if (1) the conviction has been 
the subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of re-
habilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on a 
finding of the rehabilitation of the person convicted, 
and that person has not been convicted of a subse-
quent crime which was punishable by death or im-
prisonment in excess of one year, or (2) the conviction 
has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other 
equivalent procedure based on a finding of innocence. 
(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of juvenile 
adjudications is generally not admissible under this 
rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case al-
low evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness 
other than the accused if conviction of the offense 
would be admissible to attack the credibility of <ui 
adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evi-
dence is necessary for a fair determination of the is-
sue of guilt or innocence. 
